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Abstract 
The proposal by the European Commission (EC) to establish shareholder democracy and 
mandate the one-share-one-vote (1S1V) rule has drawn much attention and controversy. In the 
pursuit of enhancing the rule’s popular appeal, EC policy-makers have tried to make 
equiproportional representation nearly an aphorism tied to corporate egalitarian sentiments 
underscoring justice, fairness and ethics.  
Against this background, the question of who could be against or oppose shareholder democracy 
and the 1S1V principle has both positive and normative implications. Based on a review of law, 
finance and economics literature, this paper evaluates the economic underpinnings and 
efficiency of the 1S1V rule and concludes that it is generally a suboptimal corporate voting 
mechanism that compromises economic efficiency and distorts the incentives of corporate 
constituencies. Moreover, it is submitted that any attempt to mandate the 1S1V rule in the EU 
may induce companies to either move to pyramidal structures, or worse yet, to use complex 
derivative instruments to decompose 1S1V. While pyramidal holdings may further facilitate the 
expropriation of private benefits of control as compared with the status-quo, the decomposition 
of 1S1V can i) advance the heterogeneity of shareholders’ preferences, ii) create incentives for 
negative voting arbitrage and iii) encourage the approval of value-reducing transactions, or 
more detrimentally, become a takeover defence. Hence, even if the EC could hypothetically 
move corporate Europe from controlled ownership structures to minority ownership ones, the 
1S1V rule is clearly worse than the status quo, and paradoxically, instead of advancing the 
rights of ‘disadvantaged shareholders’, 1S1V can further demote shareholder rights in the EU. 
As a result, 1S1V cannot promote a value-enhancing corporate governance regime in the EU in 
general or meet the policy objectives of the intervention in particular in terms of strengthening 
the rights of shareholders, enhancing third-party protection or fostering the efficiency and 
competitiveness of businesses in the EU.  
On the normative side, the issue is how corporate law can efficiently police the ability of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate rights from minority shareholders in general and extract 
private benefits in particular. Generally, it is asserted that if a corporate law regime is 
adequately structured, there is less need to worry about the voting rule and non-proportionate 
votes would not be a serious concern. In this light, this paper concludes by outlining some 
policy alternatives. First, it is proposed that EC policy-makers refrain from taking any measure 
at the level of the Community and instead strengthen disclosure rules and their enforcement. 
Furthermore, some standards of review governing significant conflict-of-interest transactions 
can be introduced. Second, it is submitted that EC policy-makers can also provide for opt-in and 
opt-out provisions for the member states. Such menus should once again be complemented by 
rigorous disclosure rules and their enforcement.  
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Introduction 
For a few years now, European Commission (EC) policy-makers have been trying to establish a 
new form of democracy in the EU – namely corporate democracy. As a result, corporate Europe 
has long been subjected to a hefty dose of inconsistency stemming from the EC’s 
Communication on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
EU, launched in 2003.
1 The Communication, as the argument goes, pursues three key policy 
objectives, to: i) strengthen the rights of shareholders, ii) enhance third-parties’ protection and 
iii) foster the efficiency and competitiveness of business.
2  
Critics of the EU’s agenda for the reform of corporate governance have questioned whether the 
reform agenda and policy measures as proposed can create a value-enhancing corporate 
governance regime in the EU. The proposals to establish shareholder democracy and enforce the 
one-share-one-vote (1S1V) rule across the board in the EU have been among the most 
controversial. Whereas the political marketability of shareholder democracy and the 1S1V 
system has dominated the agenda of EC policy-makers, the economic justification for 1S1V as a 
value-enhancing technique of corporate governance in terms of fostering efficiency and 
competitiveness has been stunningly absent.  
The conclusion this paper draws from a wider finance, economics and law scholarship is that the 
1S1V rule is simply one corporate decision-making rule among many, and not necessarily the 
best one. The conditions for 1S1V being the optimal choice are highly contestable, and 
depending on the circumstances and the nature of corporate actions, 1S1V may be value-
decreasing. Moreover, 1S1V can lead to changes involving organisational engineering and the 
applications of different derivative techniques capable of further disenfranchising minority 
shareholders in the EU. Hence, tying the 1S1V system to shareholder democracy in the pursuit 
of protecting minority shareholders is both misperceived and misguided. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the concept and 
evolution of shareholder democracy in the comparative paradigm of EU and US debate. Section 
2 presents a brief overview of the economics of corporate voting. Section 3 examines the 
optimality of the 1S1V rule in the context of complete contracting, incomplete contracting, 
takeovers, ownership pyramids and derivative instruments. It also discusses the justification and 
empirical support for 1S1V as a preferred vehicle of shareholder democracy in the EU. The 
paper concludes with summary remarks outlining key priorities and principles for revamping 
shareholder empowerment in the EU.  
                                                 
1 See European Commission (2003). 
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1. Shareholder  democracy 
Proponents of shareholder democracy in the EU have long been inspired by the principles of 
political democracy. Political democracy has evolved both conceptually and procedurally 
around two fundamental dimensions. Conceptually, the substantive view of democracy 
stipulates that an electoral system should be devised in such a way that the principles of 
democratic faith, fairness, objectivity and morals are met. Procedurally, the conception of 
democracy, as incorporating articles of conceptual substance, should provide for meaningful 
and non-discriminatory participation of the electorate in political processes through a right to 
vote. The one-person-one-vote principle and majority rule have emerged in the context of 
electoral systems in political democracies as embodying substantive and procedural dimensions 
of democracy.
3  
The recent corporate fallouts across the both sides of the Atlantic have prompted unprecedented 
regulatory response aimed at reinforcing political democracy in terms of its conceptual and 
procedural principles at the level of corporations. A regulatory response with the goal of 
establishing shareholder democracy, arguments go, seeks the protection of shareholder rights, 
the reduction of fraud, enhanced financial transparency and strong public confidence in the 
markets. This section briefly sketches the concept of corporate/shareholder democracy as it has 
emerged and evolved in the US and the EU, both conceptually and procedurally.  
Shareholder democracy in the US 
Shareholder democracy in the US has been traditionally associated with shareholder 
representation and empowerment, aimed at boosting shareholder activism and managerial 
accountability. The concept of shareholder democracy in the US has been shaped by the 
Supreme Court of Delaware, which intermediated two seminal standards of review, namely the 
Blasius Standard and the Unocal Standard. Under the Blasius Standard the Court held that “the 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of the 
directorial power rests”.
4 Under the Unocal Standard, the Court redefined the fiduciary duties of 
board members in the context of hostile takeovers by recognising that “because of the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest’s, rather than those 
of the corporation and its shareholders”, a board of directors may attempt to thwart a takeover 
bid for self-interested reasons in order to protect or entrench themselves instead of fairly 
assessing the pros and cons of a bid.
5 Hence, a board’s response should be “reasonable” and 
“proportionate” and any defensive measure taken should be necessarily in the best interests of 
the company’s shareholders.
6 Consequently, to the extent that a board’s response is 
disproportionate to the threat posed, and defensive measures taken create a “preclusive or 
coercive” effect upon shareholders, the shareholders should decide whether the board can 
                                                 
3 For the origin of the one-person-one-vote principle in the US, see e.g. Gray v. Sanders, US 368, 381 
(1963), in which Justice Douglas argues that “The conception of political equality from the Declaration of 
Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth Amendments can mean 
only one thing – one person, one vote.” See also Elstner (1998), who argues that “[political democracy is 
a] simple majority rule, based on the principle, ‘One person one vote’.” Additionally, see Issacharoff & 
Lichtman (1993), who argue that the one-person-one-vote principle is a fair, objective and easy standard 
of review to measure and remedy for any deviation from equiproportional representation in the political 
system. 
4 See Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564, A.2d 651, 659 (Delaware, 1988).  
5 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493, A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
6 Ibid. THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 3 
 
effectively continue exercising its fiduciary duties.
7 In the context of hostile takeovers, 
shareholder democracy in the US thus becomes tantamount to the ability of shareholders to 
replace the board. 
More recently, the concept of shareholder democracy in the US has witnessed dramatic changes 
and proposals in terms of shareholder approvals, nominations, voting criteria and corporate 
actions. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, has proposed a new 
director nomination rule in an effort to make the process for nominating board candidates less 
expensive and less cumbersome for shareholders and make boards more responsive and 
accountable.
8 This rule, if implemented, will allow shareholders (under some qualifying 
circumstances) to nominate directors and have their nominees listed in the company’s proxy 
materials after a ‘triggering event’ as compared with the current situation, which allows 
shareholders to nominate board candidates through incurring the costs of printing and 
distributing their own proxy materials.  
The next important ramification of the recent corporate governance debate in the US in terms of 
shareholder democracy has been emergent calls to move from a pluralistic vote to a majority 
vote.
9 Some have argued that corporate charters should mandate a majority vote for directorial 
elections, while others, such as institutional investors, have proposed that a majority vote should 
be mandatory for all aspects of corporate life.
 10 
In this context, while some scholars have strongly advocated for more corporate democracy in 
terms of shareholders being able to initiate and vote on the company’s basic corporate 
governance arrangements and “housekeeping rules of corporate law”,
11 others have posited 
fundamental concerns and doubt as to whether more shareholder empowerment is the right way 
to reform corporate and securities law in the US.
12 
Shareholder democracy in the EU 
The first such concept of shareholder democracy at the EU level was introduced by the 
recommendations of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (HLG) on takeover 
regulation in the EU in 2002.
13 Their report stated that shareholders are the owners of the 
company and they should take the ultimate decision as to whether or not to sell the company.
14 
Unreservedly, it was implied that shareholder democracy will be achieved through the principle 
of proportionality between the risk-bearing capital (non-voting stock) and decision-making on 
the one hand and the break-through rule on the other (by imposing 1S1V).
15 
The implications of these recommendations have been widely analysed in law, economic and 
finance literature. The consensus that has emerged out of that research is that the HLG’s 
recommendations on revamping the takeover market in the EU were a mixed bag of tools and 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Proposed Rule 14a-11: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-
48626; IC-26206; File No. S7-19-03 (14 October 2003) (Proposing Release). See also Press Release 
2003-133 (8 October 2003). 
9 See Borrus (2006). 
10 Ibid. 
11 See for example Hansmann & Kraakman (2001) and Bebchuk (2005). 
12 See for instance Romano (2004) and Bainbridge (2003). 
13 See European Commission (2002a).  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid; however, it would have been more correct to use equiproportional instead of proportionality.  4 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
instruments unable to promote more active and efficient takeover markets across the EU.
16 Most 
strikingly, however, in an attempt to promote shareholder democracy and decision-making in 
the EU, these recommendations could at best demote and at worst oppress real ownership rights 
and hence shareholder democracy, since they effectively redefine the concept of ownership, 
shifting it to non-owners (i.e. those with cash-flow rights) and giving them the power to decide 
whether or not to sell the company.
17  
The idea of shareholder democracy in the EU surfaced again in 2002 following the second 
report of the HLG on company law reform in the EU
18 and in 2003 following the EC’s 
Communication.
19 While corporate Europe has tried to puzzle out just how representative 
shareholder democracy should become in the EU, for EC policy-makers, corporate governance 
in general and shareholder democracy in particular have seemed to be a foregone conclusion 
alla Mead (1922): “corporate governance is associated with representative government and is 
aimed at mirroring social, economic and political institutions of a wider society into the level of 
corporations”. To implement ‘democratic representation’ at the level of corporations EC policy-
makers opted for the 1S1V rule as an instrumental choice.  
Against this background, the next section briefly discusses the economic theory of ownership 
and corporate voting.  
2.  The economics of ownership and corporate voting: A brief overview 
The economic theory of ownership and ownership structure unequivocally states that ownership 
matters.
20 Not only does ownership matter, but its distribution and exercise also matter insofar 
                                                 
16 See for example Bebchuk & Hart (2002), who claim that instead of promoting economic efficiency, the 
break-through rule will push companies towards substituting dual-class capitalisation by other structures 
of control such as pyramids. These structures can further exacerbate problems related to monitoring, 
incentives and liquidity. See also McCahery & Renneboog (2003), who argue that the costs of the break-
through rule exceed its benefits. The board neutrality and break-through rules are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for ensuring a level playing field. Each rule should be assessed on its own merits and 
efficiency implications. In addition, see Coates (2003), who effectively asserts that the break-through rule 
is not any better politically or economically than the status quo. 
17 There are two fundamental and self-contradicting principles on which the recommendations are based. 
The first is that shareholders are the owners of the company and any decision on whether or not to sell the 
company belongs to them. Hence, managers should be banned from taking any takeover defence 
measures (the board neutrality rule). The second principle is that there should be proportionality between 
risk-bearing capital and control in connection with the pre-bid structures and mechanisms of the target 
company, so that the bidder can break through the barriers for exercising control in the target company 
and exert control in proportion to his/her holdings (the break-through rule).  
The concept of risk-bearing capital has been previously unknown to economics although economic logic 
would associate it with cash flow rights. The HLG proposed that upon the acquisition of 75% of risk-
bearing capital, the bidder can break through any mechanisms and structures that deviate from 1S1V. 
Hence, in the context of takeover the claimants of residual cash flow rights acquire residual voting rights 
based on the arguments that the former bears the ultimate effects of their decisions, whereas holders of 
control rights part with some of their control rights. Paradoxically, in the takeover context this would 
mean that in the pursuit of promoting shareholder democracy in the EU, i) ownership rights are shifted 
from the real owners to the non-owners; and ii) the decision of whether or not to sell the company is not 
in the hands of the owners but in the hands of the non-owners.  
18 See European Commission (2002b). 
19 See European Commission (2003).  
20 See for example Jensen & Smith (1984), who extend the basic framework of Modigliani & Miller 
(1958) to include variables such as such as taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs, and who argue that THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 5 
 
as it is generally argued that the degree of distribution of ownership is an equilibrium response 
to the company’s operating conditions,
21 and hence these features affect the performance of the 
company and the value thereof.
22 Moreover, it is submitted that managerial performance and 
incentives depend on the degree of concentration of ownership and managers’ stake of 
ownership in the firm.
23 
Consequently, corporate voting mechanisms are critical in the context of exercising ownership 
over a wide range of corporate affairs. The 1S1V rule is a corporate voting mechanism that 
makes control exactly proportionate or equiproportional to the capital invested by tying cash 
flow rights to the voting rights for these shares. It is based on the assumption that shares entail i) 
economic ownership (cash flow rights) and voting power (voting rights) and ii) cash flow rights 
should be exactly proportionate to voting rights since shareholders are interested in higher share 
value and thus equally will vote to promote that interest so as to maximise the value of the 
company.
24 Moreover, to Easterbrook & Fischel (1983), the 1S1V rule would be a “mechanism 
by which stocks are valued [so that] the price reflects the terms of governance and operation”. 
The 1S1V principle is also generally designed as a legal counterbalance to managerial power 
along the lines of the central concept of a modern corporation, namely the separation of 
ownership and control.
25 Since minority shareholder-owners inherently suffer from collective 
action problems when attempting to monitor manager-shareholders in dispersed ownership 
structures (e.g. in the US), the argument goes that the 1S1V rule is one of the instruments that 
can be used to reduce the divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders and 
discipline wayward managers through the threat of replacement or the exercise thereof.
26  
In the US, the 1S1V rule was introduced by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1926 as 
a self-regulatory rule, which subsequently became a statutory regulation further to the Securities 
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. In 1986, demutualization and competitive forces made the 
NYSE refuse to enforce 1S1V.
27 Later, in 1990, the SEC’s imposition of 1S1V on self-
regulatory organisations was invalidated by the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which held 
that it was beyond the scope and power of the SEC to regulate the internal corporate governance 
of listed companies.
28 
                                                                                                                                               
the mix of financial claims (including debt and equity) affects the value of the firm since any changes in 
the mix change the firm’s total cash flows. See also Mayers & Smith (1986) and Masulis (1987). 
21 See for instance Demsetz (1983) as well as Demsetz & Lehn (1983). 
22 See for example Wruck (1989), Hertzel & Smith (1993), Smith (1986), Grossman & Hart (1986), 
Jensen, & Warner (2000), Grossman & Hart (1986) and finally, Grullon & Kanatas (2001). 
23 See for example Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). 
24 For more details, see for example Easterbrook & Fischel (1983), who argue that “it is not possible to 
separate the voting right from the equity interest and that someone who wants to buy a vote must buy 
stock too”. See also Easterbrook & Fischel (1991) along with Black & Kraakman (1996) – the latter 
asserting that “The case for the one share one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic 
incentives with voting power.” 
25 For more details on separation of ownership and control, see Berle & Means (1932).  
26 See Black & Kraakman (1996), in which the authors argue that “The case for the one share one vote 
rule turns primarily on its ability…to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on bad 
management.” See also Jensen & Warner (2000).  
27 See Rule 19c-4 “Governing Certain Listing or Authorization Determinations by National Securities 
Exchanges and Associations”, Securities Exchange Act 1934. For a comprehensive history of the 1S1V 
rule in the US, see for example Seligman (1986).  
28 See The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (DC Cir. 1990). 6 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
In the EU, 1S1V is already a statutory rule in some member states. The recent study by Deminor 
(2005), for example, which examines the FTSE–Eurofirst 300 companies, highlights that: 
•  The 1S1V rule is already applied by 65% of all companies analysed. Deviations occur in 
most markets but are widespread in France, the Netherlands and Sweden (see Figure A1 
in the Appendix for more details).  
•  There is variety of exceptions to the 1S1V rule. Multiple voting rights are used by 20% of 
the analysed companies and are again extensively used in France, Sweden and the 
Netherlands (see Figure A2 in the Appendix for more details on multiple voting rights 
and Figure A3 for all types of deviations by the frequency of each type).
29  
In this light, the following section evaluates how the 1S1V principle can influence shareholder 
value and whether it can be an optimal choice for shareholder empowerment. 
3.  Is the 1S1V rule optimal?  
The link between the 1S1V rule and shareholder welfare is a critical one, since the extent to 
which 1S1V can be an optimal economic arrangement in terms of best promoting shareholder 
value predetermines whether 1S1V can be the right policy instrument for EU intervention in the 
pursuit of shareholder democracy in the EU. The efficiency implications of 1S1V have been 
broadly discussed in law, finance and economic literature. At best there are conflicting views as 
to whether deviations from 1S1V increase or reduce corporate value.
30 
Is the 1S1V rule the best policy instrument to achieve shareholder democracy in the EU? To 
answer this question, the following subsections present an in-depth analysis of 1S1V in the 
context of complete contracts, incomplete contracts, takeovers, pyramidal holdings and 
derivative instruments.  
3.1  1S1V and complete contracts 
Corporate voting structures in general and the 1S1V rule in particular are irrelevant in the world 
of complete contracting, costless enforcement and homogenous shareholders. If all contracts are 
complete, then the corporate players are capable of: i) fully foreseeing all the future 
contingencies; ii) stating the course of action with respect to each contingency; and iii) writing 
comprehensive contracts at zero cost.
31 Moreover, if knowledge of the states of nature is 
common among shareholders – i.e. the states are dependent upon observable and verifiable 
variables – third parties can easily observe and enforce contracts. This means that there are no 
principle–agent problems of moral hazard and/or adverse selection. Ex ante complete 
contracting leaves no room for ex post residual decision-making, opportunism or 
divergent/heterogeneous preferences. Hence, all shareholders have identical tastes or 
preferences. Costless enforceability of contracts eliminates incentive and coordination 
problems, and thus invalidates the very necessity of ownership in general and the 1S1V rule in 
 
                                                 
29 See Deminor (2005). 
30 See for example Jarrel & Poulsen (1988) along with Partch (1987). 
31 See for example Coase (1937). Contractual completeness refers to the fact that parties can specify their 
rights and obligations with respect to all current and future states of the world.  THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 7 
 
 particular. The initial distribution of ownership and the 1S1V rule do not matter in this context 
since resources will eventually end up at their highest-value utilisation and economic efficiency 
will be maximised.
32 
3.2  1S1V and incomplete contracts  
As soon as the assumption of contractual completeness is abandoned, the incomplete 
contracting paradigm implies that shareholders are rational maximisers of their welfare but only 
boundedly so. Moreover, there are agency costs of contracting, monitoring and opportunism that 
give a rise to divergent incentives. Consequently, incomplete contracts validate the necessity of 
ownership. Not only does ownership become relevant in this context, but its distribution does as 
well. If ownership and its distribution matter, then instruments of exercising ownership in 
general and the 1S1V rule do too. The issue then becomes how 1S1V influences shareholder 
value! There might be two areas in which explanations of its influence in the incomplete 
contracting paradigm can be derived: transaction costs and the concentration of ownership, both 
of which are driven by heterogeneous preferences.  
Transaction costs 
In the transaction costs paradigm, the optimality of 1S1V can be explored based on the 
relationships between the nature of the investment, the degree of its specificity (re-
deployability/liquidity) and the cost of finance.
33 It can be generally argued that since different 
modes of finance have different costs, in this framework the level of asset specificity determines 
preferences for different modes of finance. Moreover, the degree of specificity of investment 
determines different incentives and divergent preferences, and hence, undermines the very basis 
of the 1S1V principle, namely that of “similar if not identical shareholders”.
34  
Low asset-specific (more liquid) investments can be easily financed by debt, since they are 
associated with lower transaction costs of finance, while high asset-specific investments (less 
liquid) ought to be financed by equity, since this entails lower transaction costs. This logic is 
very simple. As the degree of asset specificity of the investment increases, the degree of its 
liquidity shrinks and the transaction costs of its monitoring rise. As the liquidity shrinks, the 
value of pre-emptive rights decreases so the cost of debt finance increases. Thus, higher (lower) 
costs of debt finance induce the firm to choose lower (higher) cost equity finance for investment 
projects. More importantly, ownership and ex post residual decision-making should be allocated 
in such a way that information asymmetries and high agency costs of monitoring (post-
contractual costs) could be minimised. This can be achieved through extending adequate 
incentives to the party(ies) making the most particular, relationship-specific investment through 
conferring controlling residual voting power to such a party(ies).  
In this context, the 1S1V rule implies that high and low agency-cost shareholders, or 
alternatively shareholders with divergent preferences, obtain the same ex post decision-making 
power (voting rights). This increases information asymmetries and the agency costs of 
                                                 
32 This implies three types of efficiency: productive, allocative and distributive. Productive efficiency 
refers to the costs of goods and services produced in the economy. Allocative efficiency refers to the 
allocation of resources to the production of the goods and services consistent with societal preferences. 
Distributive efficiency refers to the efficiency with which the output and services produced are delivered 
to the society at given disposable incomes and market prices.  
33 For more information, see for example Demsetz (1983), Grossman & Hart (1986), Hart (1995) and Hart 
& Moore (1990).  
34 See for example Easterbrook & Fischel (1983). 8 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
monitoring while reducing the incentives surrounding the high agency cost factor(s), thus 
inducing further costs for the company and impacting its value. Hence, 1S1V becomes a 
suboptimal voting mechanism in the world of incomplete contracts and heterogeneous 
shareholders as defined by the degree of specificity of their investments.  
In view of these considerations, economic optimality would suggest that in order to maximise 
shareholder value, there should be complete separation between voting rights and cash flow 
rights. The party(ies) embarking on the most particular, relationship-specific investment should 
have the full non-fragmented menu of residual ex post decision-making power in the company.  
Ownership concentration 
Another framework that can shape the optimality debate concerning 1S1V is the concentration 
of ownership, once again driven by non-identical shareholders in terms of their preferences for 
control. Since 1S1V is an instrument of the distribution and exercise of power within a 
corporation, its efficiency implications vary with the degree of concentration of ownership.  
The degree of ownership concentration varies across the world’s advanced economies. There 
are different ownership structures, e.g. across the both sides of the Atlantic, with the most 
important difference being the wide presence of a controlling shareholder(s) in the EU.
35 The 
latter signifies the fact that unlike the US, ownership and control are not fully separated in most 
of continental Europe.  
Not only is there a striking difference between ownership concentration in the EU and the US, 
but the main categories of owners and the instruments of ownership vary significantly as well. 
Unlike the US, ownership in continental Europe has been generally highly concentrated through 
such instruments as pyramidal holdings, ownership cascades, disproportionate classes of shares, 
voting trusts and voting caps (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for more details).
36  
Corporate voting instruments, be it in the US or EU, have evolved historically as a result of 
different preferences for control and liquidity as well as the wider set of institutions of 
ownership and historical market structures. Dispersed ownership structures, for instance, 
inherently suffer from a problem that is generally known in the economic literature as a ‘free 
rider problem’. The essence of the problem is that in dispersed ownership structures, there will 
generally be lack of monitoring since the costs and benefits of monitoring will be shared 
disproportionally: the costs of monitoring will be incurred by an individual shareholder willing 
to do so, while the rest of the shareholders and stockholders will only benefit from any such 
monitoring without any contribution. The lack of monitoring will further exacerbate the conflict 
of interest between minority shareholders and the board by effectively allowing managers to 
benefit from diverting corporate resources by, for example, engaging in related-party 
transactions (see Gilson & Gordon, 2003), undertaking projects targeted to their needs and ends 
(see Demsetz & Lehn, 1983), pursuing visionary projects (see Jensen, 1993) or enhancing their 
human capital (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). 
Hence, in the context of dispersed ownership structures, the 1S1V rule is designed as an 
instrument among the broader set of core and supporting institutions of corporate governance to 
mitigate the agency costs of monitoring and the effects of divergent incentives between minority 
shareholders and managers – more specifically, to reinforce shareholder primacy through 
monitoring and disciplining corporate boards.  
                                                 
35 For more details, see for example Barca & Becht (2001).  
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Although concentrated ownership structures effectively overcome the free rider problem 
between small shareholders and managers by giving controlling shareholders the power and 
benefits of control, they introduce another type of agency problem, i.e. one between controlling 
and non-controlling shareholders. Through different instruments of exercising control, like those 
employed in the EU, controlling shareholder(s) can effectively curb managerial power. Thus, by 
promoting their own interests through general oversight, majority shareholders also promote 
those of the minority. Yet, structures such as ownership cascades, pyramids and voting trusts 
allow controlling shareholders to unilaterally and disproportionally benefit from their holdings 
through related-party transactions, to control premia and to freeze-out transactions to the 
detriment of non-controlling shareholders (see Gilson & Gordon, 2003).  
The latter point has two important ramifications for the optimality of 1S1V. First, the degree of 
concentration of ownership determines different incentives and divergent preferences, and as a 
result, undermines the very basis of efficiency of the 1S1V principle, namely that of “similar if 
not identical shareholders”.
37  
Second, in the context of controlling structures in general and in the EU in particular, the 1S1V 
rule as designed to discipline self-interested managers is not a suitable policy instrument since 
in most of continental Europe the nature and magnitude of agency problems is not between 
minority shareholders and wayward managers, but between minority and majority shareholders. 
Therefore, it would be a more viable and efficient step forward if EC policy-makers could 
introduce measures that could effectively constrain the private benefits of control for controlling 
shareholders on the one hand and ensure an efficient redress mechanism for minority 
shareholders on the other.  
In any case, a proper disclosure regime for such transactions is key to limiting the amount of 
control benefits accrued by controlling shareholders. As an example, the International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 Related Party Disclosures already defines how information 
should be disclosed about the transfer of resources, services or obligations between related 
parties (regardless of whether a price is charged), the nature of related-party transactions and 
outstanding balances to enable an understanding of their potential effects.
38 Moreover, IAS 
24.16 mandates disclosure of management compensation and thus constrains the ability of 
majority shareholders to compensate themselves as, for instance, board members of the 
company.
39 Furthermore, IAS 1.96 (97) requires the company to present a statement of changes 
in equity as a separate component of the financial statements, which makes equity change 
transactions more transparent and hence reduces the need for extensive legislating in this area.
40 
                                                 
37 See Easterbrook & Fischel (1983). 
38 See IAS 24 for more details.  
39 See IAS 24.16, which mandates the disclosure of compensation for key management personnel in total 
along with each of the other following categories: i) short-term employee benefits; ii) post-employment 
benefits; iii) other long-term benefits; iv) termination benefits; and v) equity compensation benefits. Key 
management personnel are those persons having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and 
controlling the activities of the entity, directly or indirectly, including all directors (whether executive or 
otherwise).  
40 See IAS 1.96, which requires that an entity shows: i) profit or loss for the period; ii) each item of 
income and expense for the period that is recognised directly in equity and the total of those items; iii) 
total income and expenses for the period (calculated as the sum of (i) and (ii)), separately itemising the 
total amounts attributable to equity holders of the parent and to minority interests; and iv) for each 
component of equity, the effects of changes in accounting policies and corrections of errors. 
Moreover, according to IAS 1.97, the following amounts may be additionally presented in IAS 1.96 or 
they may be presented in the notes: i) capital transactions with owners; ii) the balance of accumulated 
profits at the beginning and at the end of the period, and the movements for the period; and iii) a 10 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
Taking these considerations into account, the EU could, for example, better concentrate on 
strictly reinforcing accounting and standards, which might be further complemented by the 
introduction of rigorous standards of judicial review.
41  
3.3  1S1V and takeovers 
The implications of voting mechanisms in general have been widely analysed in the context of 
proxy contests for corporate control.
42 In particular, a rigorous analytical framework of the 
(non)optimality conditions of the 1S1V rule in the takeover context have been developed by the 
pioneering works of Grossman & Hart (1988) and Harris & Raviv (1988). Despite the fact that 
the proposed settings differ in certain respects,
43 the authors’ general conclusion is that the 
distribution of voting rights affects the value of the firm and under qualifying conditions (which 
almost never occurs), the 1S1V is Pareto-optimal.
44 
Based on the concepts of private and public benefits of control that accrue to the board and 
shareholders respectively, Grossman & Hart (1988) argue that 1S1V maximises the value of the 
firm as compared with dual-class capitalisation, since dual-class capitalisation coupled with the 
following qualifying conditions might allow for control to be transferred to a potentially 
inefficient bidder who enjoys private benefits of control:  
i)  shareholders have the same preferences;  
ii)  control is concentrated through a dual-class structure with a 50:50 split between the 
voting and non-voting shares that have equal cash flow rights;  
iii)  the incumbent management does not enjoy private benefits;  
iv)  there is only one party in the control contest obtaining significant private benefits; and  
v)  the bidder bids only for the voting stock, while the holders of non-voting stock incur the 
costs of inefficient management without benefiting from any control premium.  
Under these qualifying assumptions, however, the 1S1V rule would eliminate the possibility of 
inefficient management taking control. Any bidder should be able to acquire all the outstanding 
                                                                                                                                               
reconciliation between the carrying amount of each class of equity capital, share premium and each 
reserve at the beginning and at the end of the period, disclosing each movement. 
41 Gilson & Gordon (2003) argue that subjecting any transaction between the controlling shareholder and 
the company to standards of business judgement and intrinsic fairness can effectively mitigate the degree 
of extraction of private benefits of control.  
42 See for instance Edelman & Randall (2003), Gilson & Schwartz (2001), Bebchuk & Hart (2001) and 
Easterbrook & Fischel (1991). Gilson (1987) argues that only companies with weak corporate governance 
voting structures employ takeover defences in general and multiple classes of shares in particular. 
43 Grossman & Hart (1988) concentrate on the maximisation of the economic value and assume that the 
subjective probability of small shareholders being pivotal in the takeover context is zero. By contrast, 
Harris & Raviv (1988) also analyse maximisation of the social value and assume that small shareholders 
can be pivotal in the takeover context.  
44 This refers to the criterion associated with the name of Vilfredo Pareto. The underlying premise of the 
Pareto criterion is individual welfare. It holds that a group is better off if: a) every individual is better off, 
or b) at least one member of the group is better off without anyone else being worse off.  THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 11 
 
shares of the company at a share price trading under the incumbent management. Hence, 1S1V 
outperforms any dual-class structure by maximising the public (economic) value of the firm.
45  
The second seminal contribution, made by Harris & Raviv (1988), presents a trade-off between 
social and economic optimalities and argues that this trade-off determines the optimality of 
1S1V. Social optimality is achieved when the sum of the private and public benefits is 
maximised. The 1S1V principle in combination with the simple majority rule becomes socially 
optimal because it is capable of replacing wayward management. The party capable of running 
the company more efficiently obtains the control. Yet, social optimality generally is achieved to 
the detriment of economic optimality. The authors show that any dual-class structure with a full 
separation of voting rights and cash flow rights maximises the public value of the firm. 
Nevertheless, although economic efficiency endows shareholders with more benefits, it does not 
necessarily ensure the victory of the best management team. Consequently, efficiency might 
suffer as a result of the 1S1V rule.  
Under qualifying conditions, not having such a voting rule leads to inefficient acquisitions from 
the non-voting shareholders’ perspective in a Grossman & Hart-type setting. But as the 
magnitude of the inefficiency essentially turns on whether private benefits for bidders are very 
large, one wonders how relevant such an assumption is. The assumption of there only being one 
party in the control contest is not realistic. As the number of contestants increase, concentrated 
voting power allows for ‘squeezing out’ more public benefits from private benefits. The party in 
the control contest that can enjoy the greatest control benefits is also that which can run the 
company more efficiently (see also the previous arguments concerning transaction costs and 
incomplete contracts). Accordingly, as a result of a more efficient party taking control of the 
company, holders of non-voting stock can be better off.  
Moreover, the fundamental presumption of shareholders being homogenous value-maximisers is 
indefensible. The literature has long emphasised the role of behavioural and cognitive 
psychology in price performance and price behaviour over time, and hence the heterogeneity of 
preferences of corporate players.
46 They are not identical insofar as their preferences are 
concerned since they have limited, non-identical cognitive capacities to store, process and 
interpret information.
47 Different corporate players also have different perceptions or biases 
about the market and its trends. They use behavioural and judgmental faculties such as biases 
related to i) motivated reasoning, ii) self-confidence and iii) flawed statistics to seek out and 
discover valuable information in the face of informational incompleteness.
48 Consequently, the 
way in which corporate players make judgements on stock performance, for example, and how 
they determine and express their respective preferences define the way in which they are 
different from each other in their preferences and how such differences are reflected in stock 
returns and volatility.
49  
In this light, the existence of value-increasing deviations from 1S1V is further supported by 
various authors. For instance, Shleifer & Vishny (1986 and 1988), Hirshleifer &Thakor (1994) 
and Hirshleifer (1995) claim that deviations from 1S1V are necessary to extract the highest 
value from the bidder. Zingales (1994 and 1995) and Gromb (1997) further argue that dual-class 
                                                 
45 A point should be made here that any rational bidder will incorporate foreseen costs associated with the 
1S1V rule into his/her bid price, which might imply that the public value of the firm is not necessarily 
maximised under the 1S1V rule in this context.  
46 For more details, see for example Kahneman & Mark (1988) and Choi & Pritchard (2003). 
47 See Simon (1955).  
48 See Hirshleifer (2001) and Tversky & Kahneman (1974). 
49 See Goldstein & Hogarth (1977).  12 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
capitalisations with complete separation between voting and non-voting stock increases the 
efficiency of the bid. Burkart, Gromb & Panuzzi (1998) additionally contend that deviations 
from the 1S1V rule might be desirable to mitigate post-takeover agency problems in the absence 
of the mandatory bid rule. 
Jensen & Warner (2000) advance the non-optimality debate of 1S1V by concluding that 
deviations from the 1S1V rule can create more shareholder wealth since they allow for 
capturing more benefits of control from the successful bidder. Coates (2001) further claims that 
it is largely misleading to believe that 1S1V promotes takeovers while any dual class is a 
takeover defence. Even if dual-class shares can be seen as a takeover defence, Bebchuk, Coates 
& Subramanian (2002) conclude that takeover defences in general have little or no impact on 
the bid outcome.  
Martin & Partnoy (2005) further undermine the feasibility of 1S1V in the context of takeovers, 
arguing that voting arbitrage can effectively make 1S1V a suboptimal corporate voting 
mechanism and demote shareholder value. Arbitrageurs, the argument goes, can destroy the 
shareholder value in the takeover context, if their net holding position of shares as defined by 
the difference between pure holdings and the short positions is negative. The destruction can 
take two forms. First, shareholders with a net negative position can block value-enhancing 
takeovers since any value-enhancing takeover will result in a net negative cash flow for these 
shareholders and hence losses from short positions. Second, arbitrageurs can vote for 
suboptimal tender offers in order to maximise payoffs associated with net short positions. 
Accordingly, the company can be taken over by inefficient management, which will be 
consequently reflected by sliding stock prices and allow profiting from short positions. In both 
cases, the more shareholder value is destroyed, the more profits arbitrageurs make.  
The authors At, Burkart & Lee (2006) explore how voting structure, asymmetric information 
and private benefits determine the takeover outcome. They conclude that generally, 1S1V is not 
optimal in terms of promoting more value-increasing bids. 
Consequently, as a voting mechanism, the 1S1V rule cannot promote a more active and value-
enhancing corporate takeover market in the EU. Paradoxically, it can promote incentives linked 
to self-interest and takeovers that are value-destroying – or even worse a takeover defence.  
3.4 1S1V  and  pyramids 
Pyramidal holdings are designed as hierarchically intermediated chains of affiliated companies 
through a top-down chain of control as a vehicle to achieve a desired degree of trade-off 
between liquidity and control.
50 Through such structures the ultimate owner(s) retain most of the 
voting power of the chain and mostly externalise financial, risk-bearing or liquidity costs. These 
structures give an opportunity or ‘default options’ to the ultimate owner(s) to diversify risks and 
allocate resources across a portfolio of companies and contracts while ensuring necessary voting 
control is retained over the chain. Moreover, for a given value of the company, it is cheaper to 
establish and manage a pyramidal holding instead of a group of horizontally structured 
companies, since the latter requires significantly higher equity investment, lower leverage and 
as a result higher costs of management vis-à-vis pyramidal holdings.  
                                                 
50 See for example Wolfenzon (1999). For the trade-off between liquidity and control, see Coffee (1991); 
however, Aghion, Bolton & Tirole (2004) contend that highly speculative liquid markets necessitate more 
not less monitoring. See also Becht (1999). THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 13 
 
Although some authors document that pyramidal holdings can create value through “internal 
capital markets”,
51 it is also submitted that such structures allow for maximum extraction of 
private benefits by the ultimate owner(s).
52 Moreover, as compared with the negative effect that 
dual-class capitalisation has on liquidity and incentives, pyramidal holdings have a much larger 
negative impact on these variables.
53 Shleifer & Vishny (1997) argue that “large owners gain 
nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms, to generate 
private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders”.
54 La Porta et al. (2002) 
further posit that weak minority protection rules induce expropriation of outside shareholders, 
which is an increasing function of the controlling shareholders owning fewer cash flow rights. 
Nevertheless, Becht (1999) argues that the imposition of legal rules/voting mechanisms aimed 
at strengthening minority rights can indeed have negative effects on corporate performance 
insofar as they can reduce monitoring incentives and shrink liquidity.  
Against this background, the imposition of 1S1V can induce companies valuing more control 
through non-equiproportional capitalisation to switch to pyramidal structures.
55 Particularly in 
the EU, which is characterised by majority ownership and a wide variety of non-
equiproportional capitalisation, this is a plausible scenario. Hence, even if 1S1V is mandated in 
the EU, instead of meeting its policy objectives, it might indeed affect minority rights and lead 
to minority abuse as compared with, for example, dual-class capitalisation. From a policy 
perspective, it might sound prescriptive to ban pyramidal holdings. Yet that could be 
insurmountable task, as such a move would be tantamount to i) prohibiting industrial groups, 
most of which take the form of pyramidal holdings in the EU, and ii) or identifying pyramids 
and prescribing limitations on their use.
56 
Even if EC policy-makers somehow manage to ban pyramidal structures, derivative instruments 
may effectively allow the achievement of the same economic effect of separation of cash flow 
rights from voting rights of the same shares but at much higher costs, as is discussed below. 
3.5  1S1V and the market for votes  
Political, legal and economic scholarship has long dealt with the issue of the market of votes in 
terms of vote-trading in the political markets and the equilibrium conditions thereof.
57 Vote-
trading and political logrolling have long been part and parcel of the market for votes and 
political dynamics in many advanced democracies.
58 Moreover, scholarship on the issues of 
public and social choice has extensively concentrated on the political bargains and vote-trading 
outcomes as well as the stability and optimality properties thereof.
59 
                                                 
51 On the value creation of pyramidal holdings, see for example Williamson (1975), as well as Stein 
(1997) and Billet & Mauer (1999).  
52 See for example Bebchuck, Kraakman & Triantis (2000). 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Shleifer & Vishny (1997). 
55 See Becht (1999); see also Berglof & Burkart (2003), who further extend this argument in the context 
of takeover regulation. 
56 For a similar argument, see also Ferrarini (2002). 
57 See for example Buchanan & Tullock (1962), Stigler (1972), Schwartz (1977) and Pelzman (1990). 
58 For more details on logrolling, see for example Buchanan & Tullock (1962), Mueller, Philpotts & 
Vaneket (1972) and Bernholz (1973). 
59 See for example Becker (1983 and 1985) as well as Bernholz (1973).  14 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
There is an important analogy that can be drawn from the choice of the decision and legal rules 
in the political market for votes with regard to the choice of decision and legal rules in the 
corporate market for votes. Borrowing from Karlan (1999), it can be argued that on the one 
hand, shareholders’ rights to vote and voting rules have powerful, expressive individual and 
collective choice functions insofar as they reveal individual and collective choices.
60 On the 
other hand, if individual, rational value-maximising shareholders think of their votes as simply 
something to be auctioned to the highest bidder, they are likely to see the sole purpose of the 
corporate governance process as the maximisation of their own short-term self-interest.
61 
In this light, the advance of capital markets and derivative instruments has introduced many 
exchange mechanisms in the market for corporate votes. These techniques permit wholesale and 
retail vote-trading in the market for corporate votes conducive to different preferences in terms 
of control. In particular, derivative techniques allow for de facto decomposition of the 1S1V 
rule, i.e. the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights to those shares. These instruments 
also de factor endow the ability, in consonance with all legal requirements, to possess greater or 
fewer voting rights as compared with the cash flow rights of those shares, depending on the 
need and the nature of a derivative transaction.  
There are many decomposing derivative techniques such as stock lending, equity swaps, direct 
and indirect hedges and the like, which enable corporate actors to retain formal control while 
outsourcing some or most of the cash flow rights.
62 For example, stock lending allows for 
separating cash flow rights from voting power so that the borrower ends up with enough voting 
power to push through desired decisions during a general meeting of shareholders while the 
lender retains cash flow rights in exchange for some fee. This is a relatively easy technique in 
the US, where stocks amounting to 99% of market capitalisation can be lent and borrowed.
63 
Another technique to decompose 1S1V is the use of collars, in which corporate insiders hedge 
by taking put and call positions simultaneously to limit their possible risk through fixing the 
downside and upside. Any such operation effectively decomposes 1S1V by allowing the 
retention of voting powers while reducing cash flow exposure. Bettis, Bizjak & Lemmon (2001) 
argue that in the US, senior executives of listed companies use collars for 36% of their holdings, 
which allows them to outsource 25% of their cash flow exposure. 
Shareholders can also combine pure shareholdings with a short position shareholding to 
decompose 1S1V. Martin & Partnoy (2005) hold that this combination makes such shareholders 
at best indifferent to the shareholder value (when the net cash flow position is zero as a result of 
holding exactly the same number of shares and a short position in that share) and at worst 
interested in the destruction of shareholder value (when the net cash flow position is positive as 
a result of holding more shares in the short position as compared with traditional holding).  
Hu & Black (2006a and 2006b) further analyse the taxonomy and implications of security 
derivatives that allow for ‘decoupling’ cash flow rights from voting rights attached to the same 
share and conclude that such separation is indeed value-destroying, and worse yet, as compared 
with dual-class recapitalisation, does not require a shareholder vote.  
The possibility and opportunity for corporate vote-trading and de facto decomposition of 1S1V 
changes shareholder preferences and the degree to which these are reflected in the decision-
making process. In this context, the 1S1V rule simply becomes a starting point or an initial 
                                                 
60 For a basic taxonomy in the political context, see Karlan (1999). 
61 Ibid. 
62 For insider hedging and collars, see for example Bettis, Bizjak & Lemmon (2001). 
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entitlement in the market for corporate votes. The decomposition of 1S1V emerges as an 
exchange mechanism through which individual shareholders express or reveal the relative 
strength and intensity of their preferences or alternatively shareholders acquire more votes on 
issues that are more valuable to them in exchange for weak preferences on others. Any such 
vote-trading would occur until the marginal benefit of acquiring one more vote on a given issue 
is equal to its marginal cost.  
Thus, the unequivocal finding from corporate finance literature is that even if 1S1V is a 
mandatory rule, that does not preclude the application of different derivative techniques to 
decompose and de facto separate cash flow rights from voting rights attached to the same share. 
Moreover, any such decomposition may distort incentives and advance the destruction of 
shareholder value instead of promote it. This may be further exacerbated by the fact that 
decomposition does not require any kind of formal shareholder vote.  
At the same time, borrowing from Buchanan & Tullock (1962), it can contended that permitting 
those shareholders who feel strongly about an issue to compensate in some ways those whose 
opinion is feebly held can result in a great increase in the well-being of both groups, and the 
prohibition of such transactions will serve to prevent movement towards the conceptual 
boundary of shareholder optimality under almost any definition of this term. “With all side 
payments prohibited, there is no assurance that collective [shareholder] action will be taken in 
the most productive way.”
64 
Summary and concluding remarks 
Generally, EC policy-makers have not satisfied the burden of proof that establishing shareholder 
democracy and enforcing the 1S1V rule will rebuild investor confidence, protect shareholders 
and third parties as well as foster business competitiveness and efficiency across the EU. While 
opting for harmonised, mandatory 1S1V across the EU, EC policy-makers do not adequately 
substantiate why this measure is justified at the level of the Union in light of standards of 
subsidiarity and proportionality (i.e. by proving that member states are not able to implement 
this measure as efficiently as could be done at the EU level), with the argument 1S1V is 
proportional to the objective pursued. This approach has shown the ubiquitous characteristic of 
EU law-making: mandatory harmonisation has once again overshadowed the economic rationale 
of intervention.  
When trying to make the case for the 1S1V rule, a very important open question if not disregard 
remains as to the diversity of the core and supporting institutions of corporate governance in the 
EU, such as traditionally-concentrated ownership structures, multiple classes of votes, and 
complex mechanisms of retaining control and balancing the liquidity of shares. If the 1S1V 
principle was so value-enhancing, one would expect to widely observe that in the absence of a 
top-down imposition of the rule there would have been a bottom-up evolution, i.e. through i) 
companies going public with provisions for the 1S1V rule in their charters in the pursuit of 
increased ability to raise capital; and/or ii) intensive lobbying on the part of member states’ 
legislatures to provide for 1S1V in their respective jurisdictions and at the level of the EU. Since 
none of these has been a dominant phenomenon in the EU, one can argue that at the least 1S1V 
is not as valuable as presumed.  
Furthermore, if the absence of a mandatory 1S1V rule was so disempowering for shareholders 
in the EU, and if controlling shareholders have expropriated the rights of minority shareholders, 
one would expect to see a highly dysfunctional system of corporate governance in the EU in 
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general, and capital flowing to less productive use in the EU in particular. Yet empirical 
evidence shows just the opposite. On average, the stock markets in the EU have performed 
relatively well since 1982, with returns comparable to US levels (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix). In terms of macroeconomic performance the indicators also look quite good. From 
1970 to 2000, the EU’s real income was almost constant at approximately 70% of that of the US 
(see Table A4 in the Appendix). Meanwhile, the EU’s level of productivity increased over the 
same period from 65 to 90% of that of the US. On average, the EU’s total factor productivity 
was even higher in comparison with the US over the period of 1980 to 2000 (see Table A5 in 
the Appendix).  
Against this background, the conclusion this paper draws from the literature on law, economics 
and finance is that 1S1V is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for shareholder 
democracy in general or shareholder empowerment in the EU in particular. Despite the fact that 
the 1S1V rule is more politically attractive, it is suboptimal in terms of its economic efficiency. 
Even if the EU hypothetically manages to disperse ownership in the Union – which, in the light 
of the EU Takeover Directive, is an insurmountable task – at best 1S1V is clearly not a value-
enhancing mechanism in itself and at worst is associated with deadweight social losses. Most 
striking, however, is the fact that even in traditional 1S1V jurisdictions like the US, the advance 
of capital markets and corporate derivative securities effectively allow for the decomposition of 
the 1S1V system. Paradoxically, any such decomposition can distort incentives and lead to the 
destruction of shareholder value. Consequently, while trying to promote shareholder wealth, EC 
policy-makers might instead promote its destruction through the 1S1V rule.  
Moreover, there are already ample lessons to draw from 60 years of US corporate history, which 
provide a clear example with regard to policy intervention. Growing recognition of the fact that, 
as an ideological underpinning of 1S1V, a “long-standing commitment to encourage high 
standards of corporate democracy” as reflected by individual standards of “corporate 
responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders” is not adequate led to the abolition 
of the 1S1V mandatory rule in the US.
65  
This conclusion leaves a nagging question as to what is next? There might be two policy 
alternatives for EC policy-makers. The first alternative is to refrain from taking any action at the 
EU level. Instead, in view of the concentrated ownership structures in the EU, shareholder 
empowerment can be achieved through reinforcing the role of non-executive directors in the 
areas of potential conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders, rigorously 
enforcing the IAS disclosure rules and disclosure-triggering standards, and possibly introducing 
some standards of review governing significant conflict-of-interest transactions.  
The second alternative could be the introduction of an opt-in or opt-out provision in the member 
states with respect to the rule. The opt-in member states would allow companies to opt into the 
statutory 1S1V provision. The opt-out member states would allow companies to opt out of the 
1S1V rule by either charter or bylaw amendments. In light of the exemptions from the break-
through rule of the EU Takeover Directive, this approach is also consistent with the body of EU 
law. A self-regulatory approach can be further complemented by rigorous, harmonised 
transparency requirements and their enforcement. As soon as companies make their corporate 
governance arrangements in general – as well as their voting, economic ownership structures 
and decision-making rules in particular – publicly available during the initial public offering 
(IPO) and the post-IPO stages through periodic disclosures to allow investors to make informed 
decisions, there is no reason to believe that constraining investors’ and issuers’ choice with 
respect to voting and decision-making rules by law is the right option to pursue.
66 It also might 
                                                 
65 These quotations are derived from Loss & Seligman (1989-, 3
rd ed., 2003).  
66 For a choice of law debate, see for example Guzman (2000) and Choi & Guzman (2001). THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 17 
 
be beneficial to require US-style disclosure schedules such as those concerning rights attached 
to securities, directors and officers, compensation, long and short positions, articles of 
incorporation and bylaws.
67 
In the IPO stage, rational investors could discount the price of securities with voting and 
decision-making rules that disenfranchise shareholder rights and hence increase the company’s 
cost of capital. Alternatively, rational investors could pay the fair value and thus decrease the 
firm’s cost of capital if the firm offers more shareholder-friendly voting and decision-making 
rules. Accordingly, rational managers or controlling shareholders who recognise that the 1S1V 
rule matters, for instance in terms of reducing the cost of capital, would adopt such a mechanism 
even if it is not a mandatory rule. In the post-IPO stage, disclosures of any changes of voting 
and decision-making rules through proxy statements or through quarterly, semi-annual or annual 
reporting can have a similar effect as those of the IPO stage.  
 
                                                 
67 For US disclosure schedules, see for example: Item 9 of Form S-1 with respect to the corporate 
governance rights of the securities being sold, Item 11(k) of Form S-1 with respect to directors and 
officers, Item 11(l) with respect to executive compensation and Item 16(a) with respect to the articles of 
incorporation, bylaws and other documents or contracts specifying the rights of security holders.  
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Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1. Instruments of separation of ownership and control in the EU 
Member 
states  
Sample   Controlling 
owner (%) 
Pyramid 
ownership (%) 
Cross-
ownership (%) 
Owning 
family (%) 
AT 88  81.82  20.78  1.14  80.00 
BE 104  71.15  25.00  0.00  80.00 
FI 92  41.30  7.46  0.00  69.23 
FR 522  64.75  15.67  0.00  62.20 
DE 631  59.90  22.89  2.69  61.46 
IE 26  42.31  9.09  0.00  77.78 
ES 465  44.30  16.00  0.22  62.50 
IT 181  58.76  20.27  1.13  70.00 
NO 98  38.78  33.90  2.04  66.67 
PT 68  60.29  10.91  0.00  50.00 
SE 149  48.32  15.91  0.67  73.47 
UK 721  43.00  21.13  0.00  75.85 
Source: Faccio & Lang (2002). 
 
Table A2. Differentiated voting rights in Europe 
Country  Number of 
companies 
Proportion of companies with 
differentiated voting rights (%) 
Sweden 334  0.55 
Italy 208  0.41 
Finland 129  0.36 
Denmark 210  0.33 
UK 1,953  0.24 
Ireland 69  0.23 
Austria 99  0.23 
Germany 704  0.18 
France 607  0.03 
Spain 632  0.00 
Portugal 87  0.00 
Belgium 130  0.00 
Source: Bennedsen & Nielsen (2002). THE ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE CONTROVERSY | 25 
 
Table A3. Stock market performance – The EU vs. the US (%)* 
  US EU 
From 1982  1,222  1,145 
From 1987  436  426 
From 1992  164  113 
From 1997  28  13 
From 2001  -32  -34 
* From 1 January of the given year through the end of December 2002. 
 Source: Holmstrom & Kaplan (2003). 
 
Table A4. PPP GDP per person, PPP GDP per hour and hours per person, 1970 and  
2000 – The US, the EU and France (US = 100) 
  GDP per person  GDP per hour  Hours per person 
US  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Europe   69  70  65  91  101  77 
Source: Blanchard (2004). 
 
Table A5. Total factor productivity growth – The US, the EU and France, 1980-2000 
(percent per year) 
 1980s  1990s  1990-95  1995-2000 
US 0.91 1.06 0.74  1.39 
EU 1.45  1.04 1.36  0.72 
Source: Blanchard (2004). 
 
Figure A1. Companies applying the 1S1V principle in the EU 
 
Source: Deminor (2005). 26 | ARMAN KHACHATURYAN 
 
Figure A2. Number of share types in European companies 
 
Source: Deminor (2005). 
 
Figure A3. Exceptions to the 1S1V principle in the EU by the frequency of each type 
 
Source: Deminor (2005). 
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